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Few aspects of international economic relations are as contentious as the 
allegation  of  dumping and the enforcement of  antidumping statutes. 
Recently, attention has been focused on allegations by U.S. producers of 
foreign violations of U.S.  trade law, most notably in the steel sector. The 
controversy surrounding these allegations clearly has captured the atten- 
tion of  foreign governments, which have threatened to retaliate against 
the United States if  antidumping duties are assessed. To defuse a poten- 
tially explosive situation, the United States has experimented with a new 
form of administered protection, the Trigger Price Mechanism for steel, 
and has made several formal and informal attempts to negotiate orderly 
marketing arrangements with foreign governments and producers. 
Dumping complaints certainly are not limited to steel. Indeed, recent 
allegations are notable for their catholicity: in the United States alone, 
dumping complaints have ranged from trade in basic agricultural com- 
modities  to  sophisticated  high-technology  products,  encompassing 
exports from developed  and  developing countries  alike. Neither  are 
dumping allegations new; such complaints have been prevalent in the 
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international steel trade for more than a century. However, not since the 
1920s, in  the environment  of  mutual  suspicion and  costly structural 
adjustment that followed World War I, have these allegations been so 
widespread. Indeed, dumping complaints and the use of  antidumping 
policies to protect industries claiming injury from “unfair competition” 
are prototypical of the “new protectionism” of the post-Bretton Woods 
era. In contrast to the operation of  traditional trade restrictions, which 
typically entails the imposition of specific or ad valorem tariffs at well-de- 
fined rates or quotas at well-defined levels, the new protectionism  is 
characterized by trade restrictions administered on a contingent basis by 
complex bureaucracies exercising a considerable degree of  discretion. 
Antidumping duties generally, and the Trigger Price Mechanism in par- 
ticular, can be seen as instances of  this phenomenon. 
In part, recent interest in U.S. antidumping policies has been stimu- 
lated by changes in the popular connotation attached to the term “dump- 
ing.” Under the provisions of  the U.S. Antidumping Act of  1921, the 
primary definition of  dumping was export sales at a price below that of 
sales in the home market. Following Viner (1923), economists generally 
adhered to this criterion, defining dumping as price discrimination be- 
tween national markets and explaining it with familiar theories of monop- 
olistic behavior. This definition encompasses both the standard case of 
export prices  below  domestic prices  and the opposite configuration, 
known as “reverse dumping.” However, the 1921 antidumping act also 
included a provision to be invoked in the absence of comparable sales in 
foreign markets. In such instances, dumping was said to occur when 
export prices failed to cover a statutory measure of  foreign producers’ 
production costs. Nearly half a century ago, Haberler (1937) noted that 
this “rival” definition had gained considerable currency. The U.S. Trade 
Act of 1974and the Trade Agreements Act of  1979  further broadened the 
applicability of  these constructed value provisions. As dumping allega- 
tions increasingly have come to revolve around the relation of prices to 
production costs, the literature has extended beyond reasons for price 
discrimination to encompass also the motivation for sales at prices that 
fail to cover costs (e.g., Ethier 1982; Davies and McGuinness 1982). 
In this paper, we analyze dumping from both theoretical and empirical 
points of view.’ The following four sections take four quite distinct views 
of dumping and recent U.S. antidumping policies. Section 3.1 describes 
the evolution of  U.S. antidumping policies, emphasizing the changing 
definition of dumping and the development of administrative procedures. 
Section 3.2 focuses on the application of these procedures to the interna- 
tional steel trade, taking as a case study the most noteworthy of  recent 
innovations: the Trigger Price Mechanism (TPM). We analyze the ad- 
ministrative  and procedural  conventions that caused the TPM to be 
attractive in the first place but contributed ultimately to its demise, and 69  U.S. Antidumping Policies 
we examine its economic effects. Given recent events, this analysis has 
the appearance of  an extended postmortem, but we think it serves an 
important  function in  illuminating some general principles about the 
effects of  administered protection. 
Section 3.3 formulates a model that can be used to analyze dumping. 
We discuss both the “traditional”  definition of  dumping as price dis- 
crimination  among national markets  and the “modern”  definition of 
dumping as pricing below costs. Evidence presented below indicates the 
presence of  substantial price discrimination persisting for extended pe- 
riods in markets for steel products, such as cold rolled sheet and concrete 
reinforcing  bars.  For this  and  other  reasons, in  our theoretical  and 
empirical analyses we concentrate on the traditional definition of  dump- 
ing as price discrimination in international trade. Section 3.4 calibrates 
the model and uses it to illustrate how the extent of  dumping and the 
TPM’s effects depend on the model’s parameters.  The final section 
presents some concluding remarks. 
3.1  The Evolution of U.S. Antidumping Policies 
Current U.S. antidumping statutes can be traced to the Antidumping 
Act of  1921.2 The avowed purpose of the 1921  act was to deter predatory 
pricing in international trade in order to prevent foreign monopolization 
of domestic markets? Its provisions, as incorporated into the Tariff Act of 
1930, remained little changed until the 1950s. The secretary of the Trea- 
sury was to investigate dumping complaints by comparing U.S. import 
prices with  the “fair value”  of  imports. Upon finding that  fair value 
exceeded U.S. import prices, Treasury was to calculate the difference 
(known as the dumping margin) and, finding evidence of material injury 
to U.S. producers, to assess an antidumping duty. Measurement of U.S. 
import prices was straightforward: the FOB factory sales price could be 
used except when the transaction between foreign supplier and U.S. 
purchaser was not at arm’s length, in which case U.S. market price, net of 
import charges and costs of transportation and preparation for the mar- 
ket, could be substituted. From the law’s inception, the calculation of fair 
value was ambiguous, since the concept was not defined by statute. From 
1921  through 1954,  Treasury used as a standard for fair value a commodi- 
ty’s foreign market value or, in its absence, constructed value. Foreign 
market value was a transactions price, preferably observed in the ex- 
porter’s home market but otherwise in third markets. Constructed value 
was a complex measure made up of allowances for production costs, costs 
of  preparing the good for shipment, and statutory minima for general 
expenses and profits. 
Before 1955, Treasury calculations of  fair value and foreign market 
value rarely proved problematic. Most dumping cases simply were dis- 70  Barry EichengreedHans van der Ven 
posed of either on the grounds that injury was absent or on the accept- 
ance of price assurances. In 1954, however, an amendment to the anti- 
dumping act assigned responsibility for determining injury to the Tariff 
Commission and instructed that injury decisions be deferred pending 
Treasury ruling that dumping was present, thereby subjecting the Trea- 
sury’s decisions to public scrutiny. In addition, the growth of trade with 
centrally planned economies for which market prices were not readily 
observed increased Treasury’s reliance on constructed value. Repeat- 
edly, Treasury was forced to revise its procedures as new complications 
arose. On several occasions between 1958  and 1974,  antidumping regula- 
tions were modified to bring them into conformance with established 
practice. 
The amendments to the antidumping act contained in the Trade Act of 
1974 culminated this process of  revision. Of greatest consequence was 
section 205(b) which defined new circumstances under which the con- 
structed value criterion could be substituted for foreign market value!  In 
instances where sales “over an extended period of time and in substantial 
quantities” were made in the foreign producer’s home market at prices 
below costs of production, those foreign market prices were to be disre- 
garded and constructed value calculations were to be  substituted. Despite 
ambiguity about the meaning of  “an extended period” and “substantial 
quantities,” this revision of  the law represented a significant shift in the 
design of  U.S. antidumping policies from an emphasis on dumping as 
price discrimination to an emphasis on dumping as sales below cost. 
The economic effects of  the constructed value provisions in  U.S. 
antidumping statutes have been the subject of considerable discussion? 
According to U.S. antidumping law, constructed value should be a guide 
to prices which permit the recovery of raw material and fabrication costs, 
plus a 10 percent minimum allowance for general expenses and an 8 
percent  minimum  allowance for profits:  Other  than  the  “extended 
period” clause, the act makes no provision for the profit margin to vary 
over the business cycle. Thus, the law makes it difficult for firms to cut 
prices when market conditions are unfavorable and increases the likeli- 
hood that marginal cost pricing during recessions will be construed as 
dumping. Moreover, the 8 percent profit allowance, which makes no 
provision for variations in corporate finance, requires a higher return on 
equity for firms with higher debt-equity ratios, and the 10 percent allow- 
ance for general expenses makes no provision for variations  in  cost 
structure. 
These provisions provided a considerable incentive for U.S.  producers 
to file antidumping suits. In the case of the steel industry, other factors 
also contributed to the growing incidence of  dumping complaints. The 
United States had been a net importer of steel products since 1959,  and by 
1968 the import share of the U.S.  market had risen to nearly 17 percent. 71  U.S. Antidumping Policies 
In 1969 the first of  two successive voluntary export restraint agreements 
with the European Community and Japan went into effect. When the 
second of these agreements expired in 1974, coincident with the end of 
the 1972-74  steel market boom, U.S. producers pressed with growing 
vigor for further voluntary restraints, but without success.’ From 1975 
through 1977, the industry’s position worsened: three consecutive years 
of  exceptionally low shipments by  domestic producers culminated in a 
serious profit squeeze. In 1977 the Carter administration suggested that 
the U.S.  steel industry drop its campaign for quantitative import restric- 
tions in return for strict enforcement of the provisions of  the 1974 trade 
act providing protection from unfair foreign competition.  As the pro- 
ceedings of the Gilmore case (filed in early 1977) seemed to indicate, this 
approach was highly promising. When the industry initiated twenty-three 
dumping complaints, the European Community threatened to retaliate 
against the United States, while Treasury and the International Trade 
Commission were confronted by the difficulty of processing the petitions 
within required time limits. 
The administration had already established a Treasury task force to 
study the problem. Its recommendations included a reference price sys- 
tem to facilitate rapid initiation of steel dumping complaints? In the event 
that steel was imported at a price below reference prices based on the 
constructed value of Japanese steel (Japan was assumed to be the world’s 
most efficient producer), a Treasury dumping investigation automatically 
would be triggered. Hence the term “Trigger Price Mechanism.” Claim- 
ing insufficient resources both to administer the TPM and to investigate 
independent dumping complaints, Treasury warned the industry that the 
TPM would be maintained only so long as producers refrained from filing 
antidumping petitions. Eventually, the steel industry complied and with- 
drew most of  its complaints. 
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 represented an attempt to limit the 
discretion of administrative authorities, to enhance the prospect of relief 
for petitioners, and to strengthen opportunities for judicial review. Title I 
of  the 1979 act replaced the Antidumping Act of  1921. Its central provi- 
sions shortened the time limits within which an antidumping determina- 
tion must be reached. Under the new law, the preliminary determination 
of  sales at less than fair value must come within 140 or 190 days of  the 
initiation of  an investigation, depending on a case’s complexity. This 
compares with 180 or 270 days under previous law. In exceptional cir- 
cumstances, the preliminary determination now may be announced with- 
in ninety daysP 
In addition to these changes, the 1979  act marks the continued ascend- 
ancy of the constructed value criterion. Previously, when price compari- 
sons with the exporters’ home markets were appropriate but impossible, 
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comparisons with third-country markets were infeasible. Under the 1979 
act, they are allowed further discretion in the use of either third-country 
or constructed value comparisons. Although Treasury initially was in- 
structed to continue its use of third-market comparisons wherever possi- 
ble, the Department of  Commerce now has the option of  using con- 
structed value not just when there is evidence that sales fail to cover costs 
“over an extended period of  time and in  substantial quantities,”  but 
whenever necessary to meet the shortened time limits.’O Even the possibil- 
ity that constructed value calculations might be substituted for third- 
market comparisons has elicited objections from U.S. importers and 
foreign producers.“ 
Once again, the modifications in the new act provided an inducement 
to file antidumping petitions. In March 1980 the U.S. Steel Corporation 
filed a major dumping complaint against European producers, leading to 
the suspension of  the TPM. This and subsequent petitions eventually 
were withdrawn after a new set of trigger prices was adopted in October. 
However, this second understanding was even less durable than the first. 
In January 1982 the steel industry lodged a new round of 132 complaints 
under the provisions of both countervailing duty and antidumping stat- 
utes, marking the second suspension and apparently the demise of  the 
TPM. 
In summary, the evolution of U.S.  antidumping policies can be seen as 
a response to economic and administrative exigencies. As markets have 
grown increasingly integrated, criteria and procedures for determining 
dumping have been modified to expedite the decision-making process. 
Statutory and procedural changes have led to growing dependence on the 
constructed value criterion for dumping. Dissatisfaction with earlier pro- 
cedures has provided the impetus to reduce the discretion of  administra- 
tive  agencies  and to place  greater reliance  on legalistic procedures, 
leaving less room for negotiated solutions and encouraging the emer- 
gence of  adversarial relationships.  The Trigger Price Mechanism pro- 
vides a clear illustration of  these phenomena. 
3.2  The Trigger Price Mechanism 
The TPM was based on the following principles: (1) Treasury was to 
calculate for each product the average cost of production in Japan, which 
was assumed to be the world’s most efficient producer. (2) Customs was 
to collect and analyze data on production costs and prices in  major 
steel-exporting countries and to monitor imports by means of a special 
invoice for steel products, alerting Treasury to substantial or repeated 
shipments below trigger prices.  (3) In such instances, Treasury was to 
initiate an antidumping investigation without waiting to receive a com- 
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from exercising their rights under U.S. trade law, in fact the TPM was 
based on an understanding that existing dumping complaints would be 
dropped and no major new ones would be initiated. (5) Equally, the TPM 
did not prevent foreign producers from exercising their rights under U.S. 
antidumping statutes. Preclearance (assurance that exports under trigger 
price levels would not lead to the initiation of  antidumping procedures) 
would be granted if  they demonstrated that prices were not below fair 
value.  (6) If sales at less than fair value were found and injury was 
established, countervailing duties were imposed on all shipments of  the 
product by the offending producer. The level of the duty was determined 
by  the difference between either foreign market price or constructed 
value and U.S. market price; that is, without reference to trigger prices. 
The trigger price for each product was made up of three components: a 
“base price” for each product category, “extras,” and transport charges. 
The base price reflected estimates of  the average cost of  production in 
Japan. Treasury, and later Commerce, based their average cost estimates 
on confidential data supplied by Japan’s Ministry of  International Trade 
and Industry (MITI). “Extras” were added to base prices to account for 
additional costs associated with specifications  for width, thickness, chem- 
istry, or surface preparation differing from the base product. To these 
figures were added transport costs, including charges for Japanese inland 
freight, loading, ocean freight, insurance, and wharfage. These charges 
differed  for East Coast, Gulf Coast, Pacific Coast, and Great Lakes 
shipments. Importers’ sales commissions were excluded, since trigger 
prices were based on cost to importers, assuming that transactions were 
at arm’s length. If the importer was related to the exporter of the steel 
mill product and the transfer price did not reflect an arm’s-length transac- 
tion, then the first sales price by the importer to an unrelated U.S. buyer 
was compared with the trigger price. 
Trigger prices were calculated in dollars per metric ton (2,205 Ibs) or 
net ton (2,000 lbs), with quarterly adjustments for changes in estimated 
production costs, transport charges, and yen-dollar exchange rates. To 
provide  the authorities with some discretion in light of  the extent of 
exchange rate fluctuations, a 5 percent “flexibility band” was introduced 
to permit trigger prices to fluctuate around landed cost estimates. With 
the reinstatement of  the TPM in 1980, the preclearance procedure and 
the exchange rate conversion factor were altered, and an “antisurge” 
provision was added, setting quantitative rules for a special review of 
imports in  periods when steel imports were increasing and domestic 
capacity utilization was low.’z 
3.2.1  Calculating Trigger Prices 
Calculating Japanese production costs is a difficult task. (A representa- 
tive estimate is shown in table 3.1  .)  We focus on four problematic aspects 74  Barry EichengreenlHans van der Ven 
Table 3.1  Estimated Japanese Cost of Production (1981 IV, dollars per metric 
ton finished product) 
Basic raw materials 















Total  467.74 
SOURCE:  Department of  Commerce, International Trade Administration. 
of  the  cost  calculation:  estimating  normal  capacity utilization  rates, 
adding an allowance for profits, estimating yield ratios, and converting 
costs in yen into trigger prices in dollars. 
Estimates of normal capacity utilization rates mattered for calculating 
Japanese  costs because  the fixed cost component  of  total costs was 
divided by normal capacity utilization rather than current capacity utiliza- 
tion in constructing fixed costs per ton of production. For the second and 
third  quarters of  1978, cost  estimates were  based  on an 85 percent 
capacity  utilization  rate, the average for Japanese  facilities over the 
previous twenty years. In 1978 IV, Treasury switched to the average 
operating rate over the previous five years. Given Japan's relatively low 
capacity utilization  rates in the mid-l970s,  this change raised trigger 
prices by approximately $18 per net ton."  This effect became even more 
significant as the high capacity utilization years 1973-74 left the five-year 
reference period. Capacity utilization assumptions significantly affected 
estimated Japanese costs because not only 90 percent of depreciation and 
75 percent of  interest expenses, but 50 percent of labor costs and other 
expenses were included in fixed costs. 
In accordance with U.S. trade law, under the TPM an allowance for 
normal profits was added to Japanese costs in the amount of 8 percent of 
raw material costs, labor costs, and other expenses. Like fixed costs, this 
allowance was divided by normal capacity utilization rather than actual 
capacity utilization in calculating profits per ton of  production. Com- 
pared to the constructed value provision of U.S.  antidumping law, there 
was little tendency for the profit margin to rise as the level of  activity 
declined.  However, this  provision  still prevented  foreign  firms from 
emulating their domestic competitors by  reducing their markups and 
accepting lower profit margins in periods of  stagnant demand. 
The production cost data submitted by MITI were based on an 86.5 
percent yield ratio (tons of  finished steel per ton of  crude steel). U.S. 
producers, whose older facilities generated lower yields, claimed that 75  U .S. Antidumping Policies 
some of the products that were regarded as finished by the Japanese were 
scrap by U.S.  standards. Consequently, the 86.5 percent yield was low- 
ered to 80 percent. Only from 1978 IV, after a mission by the Steel Task 
Force to Japan, was the extent of Japanese superiority in steel processing 
and finishing recognized and incorporated into higher yield ratios of 82.7 
percent  and  into  higher  yield  credits,  together  reducing  estimated 
Japanese costs by as much as $15 per net ton.‘4 
While trigger prices were expressed in dollars, production costs, with 
the exception of  most raw materials, were denominated in yen. Since 
exchange rates were considerably more variable than production costs, 
initially yen were converted to dollars using a sixty-day average exchange 
rate for the period prior to announcement of the current quarter’s trigger 
prices.  After reinstatement,  this sixty-day average was replaced  by  a 
thirty-six-month moving average “to minimize the impact of  exchange 
rate fluctuations on TPM levels.”’5  This change in the exchange rate used 
to convert yen to dollars significantly affected trigger price levels.’6 
Table 3.2 illustrates  the extent to which  exchange rate conversion 
factors affected estimated Japanese production costs. For example, had 
Japanese production costs been based on current exchange rates, the 
average base price would have fallen from $395 in 1978  IV to $356 in 1979 
IV instead of  rising by  $16 over  the period.  Had a thirty-six-month 
average been used in this period, it is likely that the TPM would have 
been stillborn, because the first base price would have been $293 instead 
of  $328, a difference of  11 percent. 
In  the first year  of  the TPM, the base price  rose  18 percent, not 
withstanding a 2.8 percent downward adjustment under flexibility band 
provisions. This rise was almost exclusively attributable to appreciation 
of  the yen. It is not surprising that a one-year review of  the TPM by 
the  Steel  Tripartite  Committee  regarded  it  as  a  highly  successful 
mechanism.”  In  1979 I  the yen  began  its steep decline, which  was 
reflected in trigger prices beginning with 1979 11. Rising Japanese produc- 
tion costs were almost entirely offset by the higher yeddollar exchange 
rate: the 1980 I base price was less than 2 percent above its 1979 I level. 
Again, it is not surprising that the U.S.  industry grew increasingly dissat- 
isfied with the TPM’s operation. The U.S.  Steel Company filed its March 
1980 antidumping suits in reaction  to these developments more than 
anything else.‘8  Thus, exchange rate fluctuations play a major role in 
explaining the suspension of  the TPM. 
Following reinstatement, the thirty-six-month average was substituted 
for the sixty-day average. This reduced the risk that further depreciation 
of the yen would reduce base prices in the immediate future. The choice 
of  exchange rate conversion factor had major implications. The most 
extreme instance was in 1979 I when the difference under the two ex- 
change rate conversion factors was 20 percent. If in the first two years of Table 3.2  Influence of Exchange Rates on Trigger Prices 
Japanese Cost of  Production” 
(dollars per metric ton) 
Base Prices 
YedDollar Exchange Rate  €bed on  Based on  Based on 
Current  60-Day  36-Month  Average  Difference 
Average‘  Averaged  change  Exchange Rate  Exchange Rate  Trigger  Prices and 
@-Day  36-Month  Ex-  Average  Average  Base  between Base 
Rate  Price  Japanese 
Current  Used  Calcu-  Used  Calcu-  Hypo-  HYPO-  Hypo-  (dollars per  Cost of 
Quarter  Rateb  in TPM  lated  in  TPM  lated  thetical’  Actual  theticale  Actual  theticale  metric ton)  Productionf 
197811  221  240 
111  193  226 
IV  190  215 
1979 I  201  187 
I1  218  197 
I11  219  212 
IV  239  217 
286  341  328.23 
281  386  346.30 
274  395  363.12 
265  370  399.59 
256  359  383.94 
248  361  375.91 
241  356  378.86 
293  328.26  - 
301  346.30  - 
311  363.12  - 
32 1  388.54  -2.8% 
325  388.54  +1.2 
340  383.09  + 1.9 
354  383.09  +1.1 1980 I  244  227  236  362  379.63  370  394.97  +4.0 
::I  Suspension of  TPM 
223  223  460  443  442.83  442.83  -  I 
IV  211 
1981 I  206  211  221  468 
I1  220  204  218  442 
I11  232  218  216  446 
IV  225  234  217  457 
46 1  446.83  446.63  - 
467  446.22  466.22  - 
465  467.81  466.22  -  0.3 
445  467.74  466.22  -  0.3 
1982 I  234  227  221  446  455  463.60  466.22  +  0.6 
SOURCES:  Calculations based on International Monetary Fund, International Financial Stativrics, various issues; Department of Treasury, News,  various 
issues; Department of  Commerce, International Trade Administration, Announcement of Trigger Price Levels, various issues. 
“Base prices, which are for illustrative purposes only, do not include “extras,”  transport costs, and importation charges. 
bAverage exchange rate for the quarter. 
The  sixty-day average was based on a period terminating between one and two months before the quarter’s start. In calculating the sixty-day average 
exchange rate applied to a quarter, we average the exchange rate for the first two months of  the previous quarter. 
dAverage of  thirty-six months terminating two months before the quarter’s start. 
‘For purposes of  these calculations, base prices are corrected for flexibility band effects. One-third of Japanese costs are assumed to be expressed in dollars 
to allow for dollar-denominated raw material imports. 
‘Japanese production cost estimates may differ from base trigger prices due to use of  the flexibility  band. A “plus” indicates an upward adjustment due to 
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the TPM a thirty-six-month average had been used, Japanese production 
costs in dollars would have been 12  percent lower on average. In contrast, 
following the reinstatement of  the TPM, the difference under the two 
methods was comparatively small. 
The TPM’s first suspension was partly the result of the depreciation of 
the yen and the strength of  the dollar; its second suspension and demise 
were partly a consequence of inflation in the United States combined with 
stable Japanese production costs, in yen, and a virtually constant thirty- 
six-month average exchange rate. At the same time, fluctuations of the 
European currencies against the dollar and the yen contributed to disin- 
tegration of the second stage of the TPM. Appreciation of the yen against 
most European currencies increased European producers’ ability to ex- 
port below trigger prices (see table 3.3). Although the impact of  these 
exchange rate changes was mitigated to some extent by  raw material 
prices being quoted in dollars, it resulted in a proliferation of preclear- 
ance requests by European producers; for example, preclearance proce- 
dures on behalf of  Hoogovens of  the Netherlands indicated that they 
were capable of  exporting under trigger prices without exporting below 
fair value. With the realization that prospects for extensive antidumping 
actions were dim, the U.S. steel industry’s focus shifted increasingly to 
the issue of foreign government subsidization, and the TPM’s days were 
numbered. 
3.2.2  Economic Implications of  the TPM 
The shipping cost of  Japanese exports to the United States differs 
substantially by region (see table 3.4). Since different trigger prices were 
calculated by region, owing to differences in Japanese transport costs and 
related factors, the system significantly distorted established trade and 
Table 3.3  Exchange Rates under the Second Stage of the TPM, 
1980 IV-1982  I* 
Against  Against 
Yen”  “TPM-Yen”b  Against $“ 
Belgian franc  -  18%  -  27%  -  35% 
German mark  -  10%  -  19%  -23% 
French franc  -  18%  -  27%  -  36% 
Italian lira  -  20%  -  29%  -  39% 
British pound  -  14%  -23%  -  29% 
SOURCES:  Department of  Commerce,  International Trade Administration,  Commerce 
News, various issues; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, var- 
ious issues. 
aQuarter averages. 
bThirty-six-month average used in calculating Japanese production  costs in dollars. 
*A minus indicates an appreciation  of  the yen. 79  U.S. Antidumping Policies 
Table 3.4  Importation Charges on Japanese Steel Products, 1978 I1 
(dollars per metric ton) 
Product  Freight  Insurance  Interest  Handling  Total 




























11.18  3.63 
8.77  3.63 
8.66  4.54 
6.68  2.12 
7.77  3.63 
6.14  3.63 
6.05  4.54 









SOURCE:  Treasury News, 3 January 1978. 
production patterns. The use of  Japanese transport costs in the calcula- 
tion of trigger prices reversed the traditional geographic relationship of 
relatively low Great Lakes prices to relatively high West Coast prices.’9 
The implications for foreign producers, other than the Japanese, de- 
pended on whether their major export market was the East Coast and the 
Great Lakes or the Gulf Coast and the West. Regional differences in 
trigger prices penalized European producers whose markets were in the 
East relative to those whose markets were in the West. The effects were 
analogous for domestic firms: West  Coast producers were penalized 
relative to East Coast and Great Lakes producers, since they faced lower 
priced import competition. Both the 30 percent rise in imports on the 
Pacific Coast between 1977 and 1978, in a period when imports into the 
Great Lakes region were declining by 15 percent, and the losses experi- 
enced by Kaiser Steel (a leading West Coast producer) in an otherwise 
profitable year may have reflected these phenomena” Similarly, domes- 
tic steel-using industries in Ohio were put at a disadvantage relative to 
their competitors in California and the Southwest. European opposition 
to generous trigger prices in their major regional markets led Treasury to 
adjust downward the freight allowance to the Great Lakes, but distor- 
tions of  established trade patterns remained. 
In addition to regional price differentials, the product mix of  imports 
was altered by the TPM. For some products, differences between trigger 
prices and U.S. mill list prices were substantial, while for others they 
were minor. Compare the margins (which disregard American discount- 
ing) reported in table 3.5. A comparison of  trigger prices and American 
list prices suggests that the trigger-price/list-price  differential varied sub- 
stantially. Foreign producers specializing in relatively sophisticated, ex- Table 3.5  Trigger Price-U.S.  List Price Differentials, 1978 
Trigger Price 
1978 11,  Plus 
Estimated  U.S. Steel Co.  (1) -  (2)  U.S. Steel Co.  (1) -  (4) 
Duties  List Price  in %  List Price  in % 
East Coast  January 1978  of  (1)  February 1978  of  (1) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Hot rolled sheet  $262  $288  -9  $300  -  15 
Plate  301  324  -7  323  -8 
Cold rolled sheet  329  333  -1  358  -9 
Hot rolled bar  373  359  +4  345  +8 
Tin plate  500  481  +4  na  na 
SOURCE:  Iron Age, 16 January 1978, p. 29. 
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pensive products objected most strenuously to large positive differen- 
tials. 
Another effect was a shift by foreign producers to  the  sale of fabricated 
steel products which were exempt initially from the TPM. Imports of 
fabricated standard shapes were 71 percent higher in December 1978 
than in the previous year. In contrast to large increases in the price of 
basic  steel products,  the prices  of  TPM-exempt  fabricated standard 
shapes increased on average by only 3.5 percent from the previous year?’ 
The wire and wire rod segment of the market provides a graphic example 
of incomplete coverage: the fact that initially the TPM covered wire 
processors’ inputs but not their outputs led them to complain of negative 
effective rates of protection. Subsequent extensions of the TPM’s cover- 
age from 65 percent of imports initially to 85 percent in 1979 I1 reflected 
the administration’s recognition of  this problem. 
The establishment of  a single reference price for a particular  steel 
product, independent of origin, affects all foreign suppliers similarly only 
if  products are homogeneous. In fact, significant  quality differences exist 
in products that appear superficially to be homogeneous.22  Prior to the 
TPM, foreign  suppliers  of  low-quality steel could  use low  prices  to 
compete with suppliers of higher quality products. This was more difficult 
under the TPM, which tended, other things equal, to divert trade from 
suppliers of  low-quality steel to suppliers of  high-quality products. 
In theory, the TPM was  based on prices charged by  exporters to 
unrelated U.S. customers, or by related importers to subsequent unre- 
lated customers. However, when the exporting and importing companies 
were related, the proper measure of  compliance often was difficult to 
observe. Domestic customers could delegate steel purchases to a foreign 
branch or open an offshore trading firm to  buy foreign steel below trigger 
prices and export it to the United States above trigger prices. Similarly, 
foreign producers with downstream investments in steel processing in the 
United States could respect trigger prices in sales to U.S. subsidiaries, 
merely transferring profits from the U.S. subsidiary to the foreign base 
without  affecting any physical transactions.  The rise of  related party 
transactions from 40 to 60  percent of total imports in the first year of the 
TPM is suggestive of  the extent of these practices.= In response, Com- 
merce changed its related party monitoring procedures to include an ex 
mill price monitoring policy and new rules to evaluate unrelated resale 
prices. 
Economic considerations provided importers and exporters with ob- 
vious incentives to circumvent the Customs Bureau’s policing mecha- 
nism.  The indictment  of  the Japanese  trading  company, Mitsui,  for 
defrauding the United States provides an indication of  the techniques 
available to an imp~rter?~  To circumvent the TPM and the antidumping 
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actual payments by  customers by  arranging false contract cancelation 
confirmations, which entitled the customer to cancelation penalties; by 
providing refunds for false damage claims, misproductions, or other debit 
memoranda; by paying commissions to a foreign parent company of  an 
American customer; and by  making “currency adjustment” payments 
based on a secret “yen/dollar exchange rate agreement.” It also admitted 
predating contracts to shift the apparent sales date into the period when 
the TPM was suspended. 
We have no way of estimating the prevalence of such practices, but it is 
clear that insuring compliance is one of the major problems confronting 
architects of schemes for administered protection such as the TPM. To 
understand these problems better, it may help to look more closely at the 
motivation for dumping itself. 
3.3  Models of Dumping 
Although a number of  explanations for dumping, defined either as 
price  discrimination  in international  trade or as sales below costs of 
production, are current in policy circles, few of  these arguments have 
been subjected to formal analysis. In this section we first review the 
popular explanations, starting with the “modern” definition of dumping 
as sales below costs of production, before proceeding to the alternative 
definition of the practice as international price discrimination. Finally, we 
present a theoretical model of what seems to us a particularly important 
explanation for dumping in the international steel trade: international 
differences in industry structure and conduct in imperfectly competitive, 
segmented markets. 
Until recently there have been few formal models of reasons why firms 
may persist  in exporting at prices  below production costs.  It is well 
known, of  course, that in perfectly competitive markets where firms 
equate price with marginal cost, it may be optimal to continue operating 
at a loss during periods of depressed demand so long as revenues cover 
variable costs. However, this does not seem to be quite what those who 
criticize sales below costs have in mind. Rather, they seem to be objecting 
to practices which imply that firms have departed from their cost curves 
and are engaged in questionable practices, possibly predatory in nature. 
Ethier (1982) has presented a model in which competitive firms not only 
export at prices below costs but appear to depart from their supply curves 
when demand is unusually depressed. He assumes that firms are con- 
strained to negotiate wage contracts before the state of demand is known, 
and that they  are incapable of  responding to a demand shortfall  by 
renegotiating  wages.  Their  only option is  to lay  off  laborers whose 
contracts can be terminated. Since they are not permitted to accumulate 
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average cost when demand is unfavorable.  The unique feature of  the 
model is that there are circumstances in which it is optimal for firms to 
practice restraint in laying off workers even when labor’s wage exceeds its 
marginal product. Ethier assumes that employers and employees share 
knowledge of the shape of the wage-employment trade-off. Firms which 
retain some workers when demand is depressed despite the fact that 
labor’s wage exceeds its marginal product are able to pay lower wages, 
other things being equal, when demand is buoyant. Thus, firms engage in 
practices that bear little resemblance to a strategy of minimizing losses in 
the face of fixed costs and that therefore can be construed as predatory 
dumping.  In fact, they  are merely acting in their perceived long-run 
interest, given conditions in factor and product markets. 
Other explanations for the persistence of  pricing below apparent vari- 
able costs are based on dynamic considerations. In Eichengreen (1982) 
we analyze several dynamic models. We formalize the claim that firms 
dump intermittently to attract other firms’ loyal customers, referred to by 
Stegemann (1980) as the “short-sighted buyer”  argument. The firm’s 
problem is formulated in standard dynamic optimization terms, where 
the number of customers to whom it can sell is a slowly adjusting variable 
that depends on the firm’s past pricing policy. In response  to distur- 
bances, the firm may find it optimal to reduce price below variable cost in 
order to augment its stock of customers. At each point in time, the firm 
equates current marginal cost with marginal revenue from current sales 
plus the present value of future sales to customers acquired as a result of 
current pricing policy. This practice, which in fact equates marginal cost 
with shadow marginal revenue, resembles dumping nonetheless. 
We also formalize the argument that firms may price below the stan- 
dard  markup and perhaps below current variable  cost in  periods of 
depressed demand due to additional costs of  adjusting the level of  pro- 
duction. Again, the dynamic optimization problem is standard, except 
that  we  include  an  adjustment  cost term, specified as an  increasing 
function of  the percentage change in output. The optimal response to a 
permanent  decline in demand is fairly intuitive. As the unanticipated 
demand shortfall occurs, the firm must sharply reduce its price, since it is 
costly to cut production in response to the exogenous decline in demand. 
Over time, the firm reduces production at the optimal rate, given adjust- 
ment costs, permitting it to increase the price charged for its output. 
Although the firm is simply equating marginal revenue with shadow 
marginal cost, the initial price cut again resembles dumping. 
Another popular dynamic argument is that dumping results from firms’ 
concern with the economics of  learning by doing. If  firms wish to move 
down their learning curves, they may sell output at prices where current 
marginal costs are more than current marginal revenues. If  higher output 
now  reduces  costs of  production  later, then the solution  to a firm’s 84  Barry EichengreedHans van der Ven 
dynamic optimization problem is to set current marginal cost equal to the 
sum of  current marginal revenue plus the present value of  the indirect 
saving on future production costs. Spence (1981) has analyzed this prob- 
lem for the closed economy, and Krugman  (1982) has extended the 
analysis to the case of international competition. 
The other explanations for dumping we have labeled the “traditional” 
view. In textbooks, dumping is explained as price discrimination between 
national markets by foreign producers facing a price elasticity of demand 
in the export market that exceeds the price elasticity of  demand in their 
own  Permitting foreign suppliers to discriminate in favor of 
domestic consumers reduces the surplus captured by domestic rivals but 
by less than the increase in the surplus captured by domestic consumers. 
Domestic competitors have an incentive to lobby for restrictions on price 
discrimination by foreign suppliers, while policymakers seeking to maxi- 
mize national welfare have an incentive to 
A limitation of the textbook explanation of  dumping as monopolistic 
price  discrimination  is that  different  price  elasticities of  demand are 
assumed to arise arbitrarily from taste differences among residents of 
home and foreign countries. As Brander and Krugman (1983) note, this 
explanation provides  little guidance as to when we  should expect to 
observe dumping rather than reverse dumping or no price discrimination 
at all. 
We proceed by  analyzing the textbook explanation for dumping as 
price discrimination in international trade. However, instead of assuming 
arbitrary differences in demand, we emphasize systematic differences in 
supply. Specifically,  we focus on aspects of market structure and conduct 
that can lead to price discrimination in favor of  overseas customers. To 
highlight these factors, we assume, until explicitly stated to the contrary, 
that commodity demands in the home and foreign countries are identical. 
Thus, dumping cannot arise from arbitrary differences in  tastes.  To 
further simplify the exposition, we assume throughout the theoretical 
analysis that the common price elasticity of  demand E is constant and 
exceeds one in absolute value. 
We analyze a model made up of  two regions (or “countries”):  the 
importing and exporting, or domestic and foreign, countries. As the 
nomenclature suggests, the model does not admit of trade-pattern rever- 
sals or two-way trade in identical products. It is necessary to rule out 
reexports by assumption, for in their presence price discrimination (net of 
transport costs) is impossible. Any one of several restrictions is sufficient 
to preclude this possibility; for simplicity we assume that the exporting 
country’s market is protected by prohibitive trade restrictions. We con- 
sider a number of  specific market structures under which dumping may 
occur. Market structure is taken as parametric in that entry and exit are 
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Eichengreen (1982), but such considerations are omitted here as not 
being essential to a relatively short-run analysis of  the steel industry. 
The implication of the analysis is the same in each case: dumping will 
occur when firms producing for sale to customers in the importing coun- 
try  find  it  relatively  difficult  to  restrict  output  to  the  joint-profit- 
maximizing level. The incidence of dumping will depend on the number 
of  firms producing for each national market, their costs, their market 
shares, and the degree to which they recognize and exploit their mutual 
dependence. 
Assume initially that a homogeneous commodity Z is produced at 
home and abroad by identical single-product firms, subject to a fixed cost 
F and a constant variable cost c. 
C(  C*) is total cost of domestic (foreign) firms$’ asterisks denote foreign 
values throughout; ye is domestic firm 4’s production for the domestic 
market; and xi and xT are foreign firm i’s production for the domestic and 
foreign markets, respectively. The constant variable cost assumption is 
dispensable, but it makes for expository simplicity. Its realism is ad- 
dressed below. 
The industry in each country is comprised of a small number of oligop- 
olistic rivals. Initially, we assume that all such firms abide by the Cournot 
rule, setting quantities under the assumption that rivals’ supplies to each 
market are fixed. A variety of richer strategies are available to the firm, 
but this assumption provides a reasonable starting point. Here and be- 
low, we consistently assume that second-order and stability conditione 
are satisfied. Each firm maximizes profits IT(IT*)  subject to its rivals’ 
behavior. It is possible that firms owned or operated by  government 
agencies pursue other objectives, but we restrict our attention here to the 
implications of  profit maximization. For a representative foreign firm: 
(2)  lT~=p(Z)Xi+p*(Z*)X:-c~(X~fx~)  -e, 
where z is total supply to the domestic market (z = Zf=1 xi + ZT=k+l 
ye),  and z* is total supply to the foreign market (z* = 2f=  IxT).  There are 
k foreign firms and m -  k  domestic firms; p andp*  are the domestic and 
foreign prices of  2.  am:/ax?  implies that: 
(3)  p* -  (P*/€)(Xi*/Z*)  =  CT, 
where  E =  (-dz/dp)(p/z)  is the price elasticity of  market  demand. 
Multiplying  by x:/z* and summing over the k firms which produce for sale 
to foreign customers yields: 
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where t*  = Zf=  (xT/z*)cT is the share-weighted average of the variable 
costs of  foreign firms, and H* = 2;-  (X?/Z*)~  is the Herfindahl index of 
foreign sales concentration  .28 Since the markup over marginal cost is an 
increasing function of  H*: 
the ratio of  foreign to domestic prices (the “dumping ratio”) is: 
p* -E*  E-H 
p  E  E-H* 
___.- 
Here t is a share-weighted average of variable costs for firms selling to the 
domestic market, and H is the Herfindahl index of domestic sales concen- 
tration, defined over both domestic and foreign firms. Note that the 
Herfindahl index measures the extent to which sales to customers in a 
given country (as distinct from production by firms located in that coun- 
try) are concentrated among a small number of  rivals. The first term in 
equation (6) indicates that price will be lower in the market where, on 
average, suppliers produce subject to lower variable costs. The second 
term in (6) indicates that the domestic price/cost ratio will be lower than 
the foreign one when the domestic market is less concentrated than the 
foreign market as measured by  the Herfindahl index. The greater the 
degree of  concentration in sales, the closer the oligopolists are able to 
approach the joint-profit-maximizing solution. 
The intuition for this result is apparent. Equation (3), from which the 
dumping ratio is derived, indicates that a firm sets perceived marginal 
revenue equal to marginal cost. Perceived marginal revenue depends not 
only on market price and market elasticity of  demand but also on the 
individual firm’s market share. A smaller market share increases the 
elasticity of a firm’s perceived marginal revenue function by reducing its 
loss of  revenue on inframarginal sales. 
A special case is where all firms produce subject to identical costs. In 
this case, all firms selling in a particular market have identical market 
shares, and the Herfindahl index is simply the reciprocal of that number 
of  firms. Dumping occurs when  more firms produce  for  sale to the 
domestic market than to the foreign one, which is necessarily the case in 
this instance, given our other assumptions. The sales of  each domestic 
firm are zlm, so profits of each firm are [p(z) -  c]z/m -  F. Thus, while 
our model focuses on the price discrimination definition of dumping, it is 
compatible with the sales below cost criterion analyzed by Ethier (1982) 
and others, for  it is entirely possible in our model for profits to be negative 
during periods of  depressed demand. 
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anticipate the reactions of rivals and to introduce a competitive fringe in 
each market. To introduce the fringe firms, define: 
k 
x*= c xT+  j:  x;, 
i=  1  e=k+l 
(7) 
where there are yt - k members of  the foreign competitive fringe and 
w - s  members of  the domestic competitive fringe. Each  domestic 
oligopolist maximizes the expression: 
The first-order condition is: 
(9) 
ap ( az  p+yq-  -+  z  -+  c -  =cq. 
az  ay,  i=l  ayq  qitr  ay, 
n  axi  w  ayr) 
We assume that oligopolists neglect the reaction of fringe firms (Zg=,+l 
[ay,/ayq] = z;=k+l [axe/ayq]  = 0)  and that members of the fringe act as 
price-takers7  setting price equal to marginal cost. For algebraic simplic- 
ity, we assume that each firm’s conjecture about the reaction of each rival 
is identical?’ Multiplying by yqlz (or by xilz)  and summing over firms 
producing  for the domestic market  yields an expression that can be 
rearranged to read: 
where H is the truncated Herfindahl index for the k + s -  n largest firms 
selling to the domestic market, and 6 is the conjectural variation on rivals’ 
domestic sales?’ The dumping ratio is: 
p* -  e*  E-H(l  +6) 
p  e  €-H*(l+6*)’ 
___. 
where H* is the truncated Herfindahl index for foreign firms, defined 
over shares of foreign sales, and 6* is the conjectural variation on foreign 
rivals’ foreign sales. Thus, the dumping ratio depends on costs, on market 
demand elasticities, and on (truncated) Herfindahl indices, now adjusted 
for conjectural variations. The dumping ratio is a decreasing function of 
the conjectural variation in the domestic market, since the larger the 
conjectural variation, the greater the perceived threat of  retaliation by 
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It is a small step to derive the analogous expression when domestic and 
foreign outputs are imperfect substitutes. Let p‘ = p’(  y,  p), where p‘ is 
the price of  home output in the domestic market, and p is the price of 
foreign output in the domestic market. For simplicity of  exposition, we 
retain the assumption that the foreign market is closed to imports; thusp* 
= p*(x*). It will be necessary to consider two price ratios. Denote the 
market share of  the domestic fringe 8. Each domestic oligopolist maxi- 
mizes the expression: 
(8‘)  nq  =P’(Yt P)Yq -  Cq(Yq) -  Fq. 
The first-order condition is: 
(9’)  p’+yq--+Z  -+  c - 
ap’  ay i  ay,  ay  4w  ay,  ayr  ufv ays  ayvi 
4’ 
aP‘  dP  +y --=c 
dP  ayq 
4 
For algebraic simplicity, we again assume that each domestic oligopolist’s 
conjecture about the reaction of  each domestic rival is identical. It is 
convenient to impose two further assumptions: that each domestic oli- 
gopolist makes the same conjecture about the response of  foreign sup- 
pliers to a percentage change in its output (+ = [ap/ay,][  y,/p] is the same 
for all q),  and that each domestic oligopolist forms the same estimate of 
the ratio of  cross- to own-price elasticities in the demand for its output 
(that is, each makes the same estimate of  OL  = [ap’/dp][p/p’]). Recalling 
that oligopolists neglect the fringe’s reaction (Xr=s+  [dyU/dy4]  = 0)  and 
that members of  the fringe act as price-takers, multiplying by y41z and 
summing over domestic firms yields: 
P’  -  E’  -_ 
t’  E’(1 + 0) -  Hy(l + S) ’  (107 
where a = (1 -  €))a+,  t’  is the share-weighted average of variable costs 
for domestic firms, and E’ is the elasticity of  demand for the domestic 
good, as distinct from the elasticity of  demand for the foreign good (still 
denoted E).  H,  is the truncated Herfindahl index for the s - n largest 
domestic firms, and S is now the conjectural variation on domestic rivals’ 
behavior. Making the same assumptions about foreign firms, the dump- 
ing ratio is: 
p* -  t*  E(l + a*)  -  H;(l+  S*) 
Pt  E -  H;*  (1 + S*) 
-__.  (11’)  9 
and the ratio of  imported to domestic steel prices is: 
P-  2  E  E’(1 +a)  -Hy(l +S)  ___._.  (1  1”) 
pi  ti 
E
f
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where H:  (EX**)  is the truncated Herfindahl index defined over shares of 
sales of  the k  largest foreign firms in the domestic (foreign) market. 
Again, the dumping ratio depends on (truncated) Herfindahl  indices 
adjusted for conjectural variations. The ratioplp’ is a decreasing function 
of  the conjectural variation in the domestic market, since the larger the 
conjectural variation, the greater the extent of retaliation anticipated by 
firms contemplating a price reduction. Now, however, the dumping ratio 
also depends on market demand elasticities adjusted for the effects of u*. 
The term  IT*  reflects foreign firms’ estimates of  the substitutability of 
national outputs  (Y and foreign firms’ conjectures on their domestic rivals’ 
reactions to import price cuts +. The larger foreign firms’ conjectures on 
the reaction of  domestic firms to an import price reduction, the less the 
temptation to cut prices. 
The welfare effects of antidumping actions are illustrated in figures 3.1 
and 3.2, with zero subscripts denoting initial prices and quantities. We 
consider  the case where domestic and foreign outputs are imperfect 
substitutes for one another and analyze the effects of  an antidumping 
action which effectively places a floorpl beneath the price of imports (fig. 
3.1). Income effects are neglected throughout. Before any antidumping 
action,  there  is  a  distortion in  each  market  due to the presence  of 
imperfect competition. When the price of the importable is raised fromp, 
topl, rents accruing to foreign suppliers change by areas E -  B.  E -  B 
may be positive, in  part  since foreign producers were incapable pre- 
viously of  restricting output to joint-profit-maximizing  levels. Even in this 
x1  xo 
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case, however, foreigners may object to antidumping initiatives, since 
under the assumptions of the model any one foreign producer expects to 
increase its profits by expanding supply and driving down prices. It is 
possible for E -  B to be negative ifp, -  po  is large and if the demand for 
imports is depressed sufficiently below the joint-profit-maximizing level. 
The rise in the price of imports shifts the demand curve for domestic 
output to the right (see fig. 3.2). However, due to our assumption of  a 
constant demand elasticity and no change in firms’ conjectures, domestic 
producers do not raise prices in response to the shift in domestic demand. 
In this model, if domestic rents are zero initially, they remain zero. In this 
case import restraints do not increase the profitability of  domestic pro- 
duction, and domestic producers derive little if  any benefit from the 
imposition of antidumping duties or similar trade restrictions. In general, 
the change in domestic rents equals F + G. 
The implications for domestic consumers are straightforward. Con- 
sumers suffer a loss of surplus in the market for imported steel amounting 
to areas C + E.  Since the marginal utility of y equals the price consumers 
pay, there is no change in consumer surplus in the market for domestic 
steel. 
To measure the welfare loss associated with an antidumping action 
which raises the price of x from po  to pl,  we employ Harberger’s (1974) 91  U.S. Antidumping Policies 
standard formula  -AW  = 1l2XiATAQi + ZjKAQi, where AW is the 
change in welfare, Qi is the quantity demanded, and T, is the distortion 
due to the divergence of  price from marginal cost. The first term in this 
summation approximates area C in figure 3.1; Zj  TAQi approximates 
areas F + G - B. B is the extra loss in the market for x  due to the 
presence of a previous distortion also working to restrict demand. F + G 
is the welfare gain in the market for y, since raising the price of imports 
stimulates demand for another good whose production is depressed by 
the presence of a second distortion. Thus, for the welfare loss we have the 
expression  -AW  = (B + C)  - (F + G). 
3.4  Some Numerical Estimates 
In this section we calibrate the model of section 3.3 to illustrate how the 
extent of dumping and the TPM’s effects depend on the model’s param- 
eters. We calibrate the model for 1979, the latest year for which the 
necessary data are available and the TPM was in effect. Readers familiar 
with previous efforts along these lines will note the resemblance of  our 
approach to those of  Crandall(l981) and Tarr (1982a). Our framework 
differs from theirs, however, in that we highlight the presence of imper- 
fect competition. 
One way to proceed is to estimate pricing equations with time-series 
data. The results of section 3.3 indicate that the dumping ratio should be a 
function of the market demand elasticities, Herfindahl indices, and con- 
jectural  variations.  Using time-series  methods to  estimate this rela- 
tionship is appealing, but in this instance there are a number of impedi- 
ments to implementing this approach. Consistent time series on the value 
and volume of precisely defined categories of European steel exports can 
be constructed only from 1960 or 1966. The small size of  the sample is 
problematic when the pricing equation is nonlinear, as is the case in 
section 3.3. A further difficulty is that certain variables of interest, such as 
the conjectural variation, are unobservable. While the use of  proxies is 
feasible, it is unlikely in practice to yield definitive conclusions. In prefer- 
ence to time-series estimation, we  choose to examine what data are 
available and to use  them  as a basis for calibrating the model. The 
parameter values imposed are best thought of as informed guesses of the 
relevant magnitudes. Given that our model is highly simplified and that 
our parameter values are certainly not above dispute, we would prefer 
our estimates to be viewed as numerical illustrations of how the extent of 
dumping and the TPM’s effects depend on particular parameters. 
3.4.1  Data 
A number of sources provide information on the domestic and foreign 
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problems in establishing a concordance between U.S. statistics and those 
of other nations. In this section we examine data on the price of European 
steel exports to the United States relative to the price of the same goods in 
Europe,  since European producers  were  among  the  exporters  most 
heavily affected by  U.S. trigger prices. While official base prices for 
European steel products are readily available, the prevalence  of  dis- 
counting in the European steel market renders them a poor proxy for 
transactions prices.  We choose instead to examine unit value figures 
derived from international trade statistics. Thus, for the price of  Euro- 
pean steel in Europe, we use unit values of  intra-European  Community 
(EC) trade. By implication, we neglect discounting by European produc- 
ers in sales to their favored domestic customers. Unit values are them- 
selves imperfect proxies for transactions prices; a number of authors have 
shown that changes in calculated unit values tend to lag behind changes in 
transactions prices. While this problem should be borne in mind, it is 
more important in other applications than when trade figures are annual 
totals and when one set of  unit values is deflated by another. 
Calculated unit values for  European exports have  been  employed 
previously by Tarr (1979, 1982b) and Takacs (1982). However, their 
figures are not appropriate for our purposes, since they do not distinguish 
European exports to the United States from European exports bound for 
other destinations. Our figures for unit values of  European steel exports 
to the United States and intra-EC steel trade, drawn from the European 
Community's Analytical Tables of  Foreign Trade, are available at a low 
level of  aggregation, permitting us  to present  statistics for relatively 
homogeneous product categories. For example, we consider only con- 
crete reinforcing bars, eliminating other bars from that category, and 
remove hot rolled sheet and plate from the figures for sheet and plate less 
than 3 mm used by Tarr and Takacs. While product-mix effects may not 
be eliminated entirely, their influence should be minimized by our use of 
narrow product categories. 
Table 3.6 presents the ratio  of  domestic to export prices for four 
categories of European steel products: rails, wire rod, concrete reinforc- 
ing bars, and cold rolled sheet. The dumping ratios exhibit a striking 
degree of variation. Regressing the unit value of exports destined for the 
United States on a constant term and the intra-EC export unit value leads 
in every case to rejection of  the joint hypothesis of a zero constant and a 
slope coefficient of  unity?' Interestingly, the dumping ratios in table 3.6 
are similar to the price differentials of up to 40 percent reported by Kravis 
and Lipsey (1977) for German-American trade in bars and in tube and 
pipe fittings. 
3.4.2  Dumping Ratios 
Our  calculated dumping ratios will differ greatly depending on whether 
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Table 3.6  Relative Price of European Steel Exports to United States 
("domestic" unit value relative to export unit value) 
Concrete  Cold 
Reinforcing  Rolled 



























































































SOURCE:  European Community, Analytical Tables of Foreign Trade, various issues. 
NOTE:  Values greater than one indicate price discrimination in favor of the United States. 
na: not available. 
"NIMEXE 7316.14, 7316.16 
bNIMEXE 7310.11, 7363.21, 7373.23, 7373.24, 7373.25, 7373.26, 7373.29. 
'NIMEXE  7310.13. 
dNIMEXE 7313.43,  7313.45,  7313.47,  7313.49,  7313.50,  7313.92,  7365.55,  7365.81, 
7375.63, 7375.64, 7375.69, 7375.83, 7375.84, 7375.89. 
substitutes. Evidence on this issue is far from conclusive. Many carbon 
steel products appear undifferentiated-concrete  reinforcing bars being 
perhaps the best instance in our sample. At the same time, as noted in 
section 3.2, subtle quality differences are cited frequently in studies of 
import penetration. The imperfect substitutes assumption is supported 
by  all recent empirical studies, so we adopt it here. 
Prices are assumed to be set in accordance with a generalized version of 
equation (11'). For European steel: 
p* -  E*  E*  ~(1  +a*)  -  H,*(l + 6) 
p  EE  E* -  H,**(l+  S*) 
___._.  (12) 
In contrast  to (ll'),  market  demand elasticities E(E*)  are allowed to 94  Barry EichengreedHans van der Ven 
differ, and we consider standard Herfindahl indices. For price elasticities 
of demand, we draw on work by Stone (1979). For iron and steel semi- 
manufactures, Stone reports import demand elasticities of 2.83 and 1.66 
for the United States and the European Community, respectively. We 
use  1.66 as the market demand elasticity for Europe and 2.83 as the 
own-price elasticity of  demand in U.S. import demand functions. 
In constructing Herfindahl indices, we treat each national European 
industry as a joint-profit maximizer. While it is a drastic simplification,  we 
impose this assumption in recognition of the extent of nationalization and 
pervasive government involvement in the various national  industries. 
Thus, the Herfindahl indices measure the extent to which sales by Euro- 
pean  producers,  either to the U.S. market  or within the European 
Community, are concentrated nationally. For 1979, values for HZ* and 
Hx*,  calculated as in table 3.6 and weighted by product shares, are .335 
and .215, respectively. Relaxing the assumption of joint-profit maximiza- 
tion would tend to lower the Herfindahl indices and reduce the price-cost 
margins. For the conjectural variations, we consider the Cournot and 
constant market share values of zero and unity. IT* is calibrated at 0 and 
-0.1.  In the absence of  contrary evidence, we set e*/e to unity. 
The dumping ratios for 1979 generated by equation (12) are presented 
in table 3.7. For the parameter values considered, the dumping ratio falls 
within the range of  values in table 3.6. 
3.4.3  The TPM’s Effects 
For purposes of our calculations, it is necessary to consider the supply 
response of  Japan and other exporting nations against whom the TPM 
was not primarily directed. If, for example, trigger prices restrict exports 
by  the European Community and other suppliers whose costs are high 
relative to those in Japan, the incipient change in U.S.  import prices may 
Table 3.7  Calculated Dumping Ratios (p*/p) 
6* 
u=O  0  1 
6  0  1.158  1.549 
1  1.063  1.409 
6* 
u = -0.1  0  1 
0  1.033  1.382 
1  0.937  1.314  6 
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elicit increased exports by suppliers whose costs are relatively low. The 
effect will  be smaller the larger the supply response  of  the so-called 
restrained suppliers, to use the terminology of Tarr (1982a).32  In our view, 
while restrained suppliers possessed considerable excess capacity both 
prior to and in the period of  the TPM, they resisted the temptation to 
increase exports to the United  States. Hence, we  assume no supply 
response by restrained suppliers to the imposition of trigger prices. In the 
welfare calculations that follow, we treat their supply curves as inelastic 
and their markets as undistorted. In this and other respects, our analysis 
is partial equilibrium. 
In what follows, we distinguish three categories of steel: steel produced 
domestically, steel imported from Europe, and steel imported from other 
countries. Each of our demand functions has their three respective prices 
as arguments. As a first approximation, we treat foreign producers other 
than European as restrained suppliers. 
We model the TPM as simply placing a floor under the price of U.S. 
imports at the 1979 average trigger price of  $350 per net ton. Thus, we 
neglect problems of noncompliance and related complications discussed 
in section 3.2. To quantify the TPM's effects, we use equations such as 
(12) to calculate the prices that would have obtained in the mechanism's 
absence. To  do so, it is necessary to select specific values for E and E'.  The 
ratio of domestic to foreign costs is a fiercely debated issue which cannot 
be resolved here; we set Elf' equal to 1.2, and for upper and lower bounds 
we calibrate E at $230 and $290 per net ton.'3 We do not distinguish U.S. 
exports from domestic sales. U.S. exports are small in volume and value; 
adding this distinction would only modify our measures in minor ways at 
the cost of further complexity. In the absence of precise estimates, we set 
the own-price elasticity of  demand for domestic steel to unity and all 
cross-price elasticities to half the value of own-price elasticities, thereby 
insuring that demands are homogeneous of degree zero in prices. Given 
the manner in which U.S. mill list prices appear to have hovered around 
trigger prices, we set the price of  domestic steel at $350 per net ton. 
The results of our numerical calculations are shown in table 3.8 for the 
cases where the TPM would be binding. As indicated above, the magni- 
tude of the effects and the sign of the net change in welfare depend largely 
on whether the initial distortion in domestic markets is large relative to 
the rise in import prices caused by the TPM. In cases (1) through (4), the 
domestic distortion is large and the welfare effects are easily interpreted. 
European producers suffer a loss of  surplus, while U.S. producers and 
foreign restrained suppliers receive additional rents. Since the markup 
charged by domestic producers is relatively large, so is the transfer they 
receive.  Thus, domestic producers receive the largest portion  of  the 
incremental rents. The estimated efficiency gain ranges from $1931.4 
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Table 3.8  Illustrative Effects of the TPM, 1979 (in $ million) 
Change  Change in  Transfer  Transfer to  Transfer 
in  Consumer  to U.S.  European  to Other 
Welfare  Surplus  Producers  Producers  Producers 
(1)  2 = 230  6=0  u=  0 
+5985.6  -  853.0  +  6396.0  -87.7  +  530.3 
(2)  t = 230  6=1  u=  0 
+4222.3  -  657.4  +4600.1  -  135.2  +414.8 
(3)  E = 230  6=0  u=  -0.1 
(4)  E = 230  6=1  u=  -0.1 
+  3617.5  -  616.2  +4001.0  -  140.1  +  372.8 
+ 1931.4  -380.1  +2205.5  -  119.8  +225.8 
(5)  E = 290  6=0  u= 0 
-29.7  -240.2  +49.0  -  27.5  + 189.0 
(6)  E =  290  6=1  u= 0 
-5.3  -51.8  +13.1  -  8.6  +42.0 
SOURCE:  See text. 
When the domestic distortion is relatively small, as in cases (5)  and (6), 
the sign of the welfare effect is reversed. On balance, the loss to consum- 
ers outweighs the gain to producers. Foreign firms capture the largest 
share of  transfers to producers, and there is an overall loss of  efficiency 
which ranges from $5.3 million to $29.7 million. These effects resemble 
what we referred to in section 3.3 as the standard textbook case. 
The unusual welfare effects in cases (1) through (4) provide a graphic 
illustration of  the theory of  the second best:  when distortions in the 
market for domestic steel are severe relative to distortions in the market 
for imports, it is possible to reduce the deadweight loss by adding distor- 
tions on the import side. Having mentioned this possibility compels us to 
close on a cautionary note. If  antidumping action can be welfare improv- 
ing because  of  distortions in domestic markets, first-best policies ad- 
dressed at those domestic distortions are still to be preferred. In our case, 
promoting  competition can  alleviate the domestic distortion without 
causing any loss on the import side. 
Although we have attempted to extend simple welfare calculations in a 
number of directions, our model ultimately remains partial equilibrium. 
We have already seen how effects that are usually dismissed as second 
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Among the effects we have suppressed are distortions in factor markets, 
changes in the extent of collusion, dangers of foreign retaliation, and rent 
seeking by domestic factors of production; this last possibility, for exam- 
ple, greatly diminishes the likelihood that the additional distortion will 
enhance welfare. Many of these extensions are readily incorporated into 
our framework. Even without these complications, however, our analysis 
suggests that governments must be able to estimate a relatively large 
number of  parameters with considerable accuracy before they can be 
assured that this form of  intervention is welfare improving. 
3.5  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have analyzed dumping and U.S.  antidumping policy 
from a number of  different perspectives. While attempting to address a 
broad range of questions in a relatively few pages, we recognize that each 
of these issues warrants more extensive treatment. The first sections of 
the paper analyze the evolution  of  U.S. antidumping policy and the 
design of  the Trigger Price Mechanism. To understand the evolution of 
antidumping policy, we have argued, it is necessary to analyze how policy 
is adapted in response to political pressures; the TPM provides a dramatic 
illustration  of  these  considerations.  From  the  point  of  view  of  its 
architects, who felt pressure from  all sides, the TPM was a political 
masterpiece. Economically, it was perhaps less masterful; its exponents 
may have incompletely anticipated how administered protection could 
distort established patterns of  trade and production. An analysis of the 
TPM demonstrates also how administrative decisions on seemingly minor 
points-such  as the exchange rate to use in computing costs-can have 
major economic effects. 
The latter sections of  the paper use theoretical models to explain the 
sources of  dumping and to illustrate the magnitude of  its effects. The 
models of  most relevance to the practices currently at issue in the steel 
industry seem to us models of oligopolistic rivalry in imperfectly competi- 
tive, segmented markets. Basing our analysis on the traditional economic 
definition of  dumping as price discrimination in international trade, we 
have attempted to identify a number of  crucial variables on which the 
incidence of  dumping will depend: the number of  firms producing for 
each national market, their costs, their market shares, and the extent to 
which they recognize and exploit their mutual dependence. Finally, we 
have used these models of imperfect competition to illustrate how the size 
of  the dumping ratio and the incidence of  the TPM depend on certain 
crucial parameter values.  Much remains to be done to establish the 
generality of our framework, but we hope that we at least have stimulated 
some of  our readers to think along these lines. 98  Barry Eichengreen/Hans van der Ven 
Notes 
1. In this paper we are concerned solely with dumping and U.S. antidumping policies. 
We do not discuss countervailing duties imposed in response to foreign government sub- 
sidization of  exports. However, see note 27 below. 
2.  Antidumping measures also were included in  the Revenue Act of  1916, whose 
provisions proved difficult to administer. 
3.  U.S. Senate (1934) discusses the origins of  the 1921 act. 
4.  The immediate impetus for the change was a complaint that Canadian sulfur was 
being sold in  both U.S.  and Canadian markets at prices below cost. The 1974 act also 
authorized the Treasury to base constructed value calculations on data for comparable 
market economies when production costs in state-controlled economies proved difficult to 
measure. 
5. See, for example, Crandall(1978,1980), U.S. General Accounting Office (1979), and 
Kawahito (1981). 
6.  Section 206(a) of  the Trade Act of  1974 defined constructed value as the sum of (1) 
“The cost of materials . . . and of fabrication or other processing. .  . at a time preceding the 
date of exportation of the merchandise under consideration which would ordinarily permit 
the production of that particular merchandise in the ordinary course of business.” (2) “An 
amount for general expenses . . . not less than ten percent of material and of  fabrication 
costs.” (3) “An amount for profit not less than eight percent of  the sum of  material and 
fabrication costs and general expenses.” (4) “The cost of all containers and coverings . . . 
and all other expenses incidental to placing the merchandise . . .  in condition . .  . ready for 
shipment to the United States.” 
7. The debate over voluntary restraint  agreements is recounted by  Takacs (1976), 
Mueller and Kawahito (1979), and Adams and Dirlam (1980). 
8. In the words of  its architects, the system was to “expedite relief from unfair import 
competition, but to do so in a manner which would not preclude competition in the U.S. 
market.” See Solomon (1977, 8). 
9.  Treasury must acquire sufficient information on which to base a determination within 
seventy-five  days, and the complainant must waive his right to verify the exporter’s submis- 
sion. In a related action, responsibility for enforcing US. antidumping statutes was trans- 
ferred from Treasury to the Department of  Commerce. 
10. In practice, the constructed value provisions do not appear to have been invoked on 
these grounds. 
11.  American Importers Association (1979, 21); Sat0 and Hodin (1982, 37). 
12. U.S. Department of  Commerce (1980, 5). 
13.  Treasury News, 20 July 1980, p. 3. 
14. Zbid. If  the yield ratio is 80 percent, the other 20 percent is scrap. A credit in the 
amount of the value of the scrap was applied to production cost estimates for finished steel. 
The yield credit was raised in 1978 IV on the grounds that Japanese scrap was actually a 
higher valued secondary material. 
15. U.S. Department of  Commerce (1980, 4). 
16. We  neglect feedback from trigger prices to exchange rates,  and from there to 
domestic costs. The assumption that such feedback was negligible is crucial to our inter- 
pretation of  table 3.2. On these effects, see Eichengreen (1981, 1983). 
17. Steel Tripartite Committee (1979, 8). 
18. Mueller (1980, 1). 
19. Dirlam and Mueller (1981, 13). 
20.  McCormack (1981, 313). See also American Iron and Steel Institute (1978). 
21.  See Treasury News, 13 April 1978. 99  U.S. Antidumping Policies 
22.  For a recent analysis, see U.S. General Accounting Office (1980, chap. 3; 1981, 
chap. 3). Similar points were made some years ago by Jondrow et al. (1976). 
23.  U.S. General Accounting Office (1980, 21). See Dirlam and Mueller (1981) and 
Walter (1982) for discussions of  these allegations. 
24.  See United States versus Mitsui (1982). 
25.  See, for example, Caves and Jones (1973, 212-14),  or Corden (1974, 235-47). 
26. This is not to imply that there is no role for policy toward industries facing import 
competition. For analyses of  the arguments for adjustment assistance, see Bhagwati (1982). 
27.  It would be straightforward  to introduce production  and export subsidies at this 
point. However, as noted above,  we feel that the subsidy question is logically distinct from 
the issues analyzed here, so we make no attempt to incorporate it into our model. For a 
similar approach to analyzing subsidies, see Brander and Spencer (1982). It would also be 
straightforward to introduce transport costs. Although we do  not treat such costs explicitly, 
they can be thought of  as a component of  c. See also Brander (1981) and Brander and 
Krugman (1983). 
28.  See Rader (1972), Dansby and Willig (1979), and, for an elegant application to the 
Japanese steel industry, Yamawaki (1982). 
29.  In other words, we assume Sf=.=,  (dx,ldy,)  = P",,,(dy,/dy,)  for all i, q,  and r. Dixit 
and Stern (1982) argue that this assumption captures the case where oligopolists are in the 
industry on broadly equal terms. 
30.  If  the oligopolists take fringe firms' reactions into account, then we get the standard 
Herfindahl index in place of  the truncated index. The conjectural variation is the firm's 
estimate of  the slope of rivals' reaction functions. It can be heuristically interpreted as the 
perceived probability of retaliation. Thus, 6 = 0 is the Cournot case, and 6 = 1 is the case 
where each firm  believes that other firms will try to preserve market shares. Cases of  8 <  0, 
while  conceivable,  are not considered  here.  Firms'  conjectures  are taken as constant 
throughout. Modeling conjectures as rational makes it difficult to characterize industry 
equilibrium, so we follow standard practice by taking conjectural variations as exogenous. 
On rational conjectural variations, see citations in Kamien and Schwartz (1981). 
31.  Variables are in logs. Such tests of  the 'law of  one price'  are surveyed by Crouhy- 
Veyrac, Crouhy, and Melitz (1982). 
32.  Were national outputs perfect substitutes and market imperfections absent, one 
could visualize a scenario in which U.S. antidumping policy administered under the TPM 
caused European steel formerly destined for the United States to be diverted to Japanese 
markets or to remain in Europe and a corresponding quantity of Japanese production to be 
diverted to the United States. In fact, allegations of this type of activity on part of  European 
and Japanese producers have recently been made by the U.S. steel industry. Neglecting 
transport costs, in this case U.S. antidumping policies would have no efficiency or distribu- 
tional effects. When steel products produced in different countries are imperfect substi- 
tutes, the analysis is more complicated but the implication is the same. 
33.  Mueller and Kawahito (1978) review the available evidence and present estimates of 
their own. For example, for 1976 their estimate of  the ratio of  European to U.S. costs is 
1.17. In this paper we present no evidence on the constancy of  variable cost. Since Takacs 
(1976) finds marginal costs to be slightly declining, while others  such as Crandall(l981) treat 
them as rising, this seems to be a judicious compromise. Our estimates off*  for 1979 are 
constructed by adjusting Mueller and Kawahito's figure of $205 in 1976 for the change in 
prices of  industrial goods. We  think of  these figures as including costs of variable labor, coal, 
fuel oil, natural gas, electricity, iron ore and scrap, plus transportation and related ex- 
penses.  For a number of  reasons, including the fact that their calculations exclude the 
United Kingdom, there is reason to treat $230 as a lower bound; we use $290 as an upper 
bound. We recognize, however, that we have suppressed the large cost differentials that 
exist among producers in a given location. 100  Barry EichengreedHans van der Ven 
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Comment  Wilfred J. Ethier 
This excellent paper is notable both for its contribution to the theory of 
dumping in general and for its discussion of the Trigger Price Mechanism 
in particular. The paper opens with a historical overview of  U.S.  policy. 
The central theme is the evolutionary rise in importance of  the sales- 
below-cost criterion of dumping relative to the price-discrimination crite- 
rion. I agree with  this conclusion and would only add that the steel 
industry  itself  apparently played  a significant role in the process  by 
alleging sales below cost in its 1977 complaints, which led to the Gilmore 
case and to the TPM. Basic characteristics of  the U.S. steel industry 
appear to have been relevant here; I discuss this in more detail below. 
The paper’s discussion of  the actual operation of  the TPM is a detailed 
and perceptive case study that makes fascinating reading. I wish both that 
the authors had supplied background information on the steel industry 
(the U.S. industry in particular),  since the nature of  that industry is 
central to the dumping issue, and that they had discussed government 
subsidies, which were important in the demise of  the TPM. But I do 
understand the strict adherence to their topic. 
In the formal model and its calibration, the basic assumption is made 
that dumping (of  steel) is in essence a matter of  price discrimination, 
presumably in contrast to sales below cost. (Though the latter are not 
inconsistent with the model, as Eichengreen and van der Ven note; they 
are tangential). This contrasts sharply with the earlier parts of the paper 
emphasizing the gradually increasing relative importance of  the sales- 
below-cost criterion and describing in detail the operation of  a system 
based, at bottom, on that criterion. This assumption is defended on the 
grounds that oligopolistic rivalry in segmented markets seems to be a 
prominent characteristic of  the steel industry. I concede the validity of 
this observation, and also that of  the persistence of  dual pricing in the 
industry about which this paper offers interesting evidence of its own. But 
accepting the practical validity of  the assumption basic to this paper’s 
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model is hardly the same as conceding that it captures what is central to 
dumping in the steel industry. 
An alternative is available. Many observers would point instead to a 
large ratio of fixed to variable costs, a great sensitivity to cyclical fluctua- 
tions in demand, factor-market  rigidities, worldwide excess capacity, 
and, especially in the U.S. industry, a downward inflexibility of domestic 
steel prices as the characteristics most intimately related to the issue of 
dumping. Similar characteristics do seem widely prevalent in industries 
where dumping is an issue (e.g. ,  see Lloyd 1977), and steel is an interest- 
ing special case precisely because the characteristics are thought to be 
especially pronounced there. They are central to the view that antidump- 
ing efforts of  the U.S. steel industry-and  that industry’s concern with 
the cost of  production criterion and with subsidies-are  motivated at 
bottom by the desire to prevent imports from destroying the industry’s 
traditional practice of maintaining domestic price levels during periods of 
depressed demand (e.g., see Dale 1980). If  this alternative view has 
validity,  the model  of  this  paper, though  not  inconsistent  with  this 
alternative, completely misses the essentials of  antidumping actions in 
the steel industry. This paper therefore requires a detailed defense of the 
proposition that the characteristics embodied in its model are in fact more 
central to dumping than are those characteristics emphasized by  this 
alternative view. Merely pointing to the existence of oligopolistic rivalry 
in  segmented markets, as the authors do, is no substitute for such a 
defense. 
Turn now to the actual structure of the formal model. Price discrimina- 
tion theories must all cope with the problem of explaining why firms face 
different elasticities of  demand in different markets and why the differ- 
ences should induce dumping rather than reverse dumping. Eichengreen 
and van  der Ven dispose of  this problem in  a simple and ingenious 
fashion. Essentially, if a fixed number of foreign oligopolists export to the 
home market, but domestic oligopolists are prevented from also export- 
ing, then there will be more competition in the domestic market and 
consequently a lower price, other things being equal. Note the crucial 
role of  the imposed entry asymmetry: this model assumes without ex- 
planation that the United States is the dumping ground of the world steel 
industry. 
The model is used only to devise a formula for the dumping ratio. The 
formula is then shown to easily adapt to many complicating amendments, 
and this is certainly one of  the attractions of  the model. But the welfare 
analysis of antidumping actions is then conducted in the usual geometric 
fashion, completely divorced from the model. It would have been desir- 
able-and  easy-to  embed the model in a simple general equilibrium 
framework and to use that to derive explicit analytic formulas for the 
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The empirical material is, as the authors point out, a “calibration” of 
the model and not an estimate of its parameters or, in any sense, a test of 
its validity or relevance. It is rather a very useful “what if” exercise. Note 
that what distinguishes this exercise from the standard ones involving 
commercial policy is not the policy tool: the special features of  the TPM 
play no role at all in this part of  the paper. Rather it is the particular 
price-discrimination context  in  which  the protection is hypothetically 
applied. The resulting useful discussion of possible welfare consequences 
brings out very nicely-and  quite sharply-the  inherent “double distor- 
tion” situation. But note that this makes even more crucial the unfortu- 
nate lack of  justification for the basic assumption about dumping that 
underlies the formal model. 
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Comment  Gary N. Horlick 
Eichengreen and van der Ven have undertaken an ambitious and difficult 
task: explaining the evolution of  U.S. antidumping policies in general 
(and specifically for steel) and evaluating the effects of  those policies. I 
found the results very interesting and useful. The dumping model pre- 
sented, which may fit many product sectors well, may be too general to 
deal with a category as varied as steel. The analysis of the effects of  the 
steel Trigger Price Mechanism rests on some published materials that are 
not entirely accurate. Finally, the analysis of  the evolution of  dumping 
policies is sound enough in  general outline, but somewhat exaggerates 
the degree of  the shift toward use of constructed value as the measure of 
fair value. 
The authors are correct in noting a shift toward the use of constructed 
value as the basis for fair value in dumping cases after passage of  the 
Trade Act of  1974 and the Trade Agreements Act of  1979. They believe 
that speeding up the decision-making process was a spur behind the move 
to constructed value; in fact, as the authors note, the 1974 amendment 
responded to the perceived facts of  one specific case. While constructed 
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value cases have turned out to be less difficult than they were at first 
thought to be, particularly when the alternative is to make extremely 
complex adjustments for differences in merchandise, they are still more 
time-consuming than a “normal” price-to-price comparison. 
We have found increasing numbers of  cases in which merchandise is 
produced specifically for export to the United States, or, particularly in 
steel, where home market sales have been below the cost of  production 
for  a sustained period.  In  these  cases,  we  have  been  forced  to use 
constructed value. 
Nevertheless, our preference is for home market prices-in  fact, we 
are required to use home market prices if  they are sufficient in quantity 
and above cost. Only if  adequate home market sales are not available do 
we consider using third-market sales or constructed value, and our pref- 
erence then is for third-country sales prices; that preference is codified in 
our regulations (19 C.F.R. 353.4 [c]). Where prices are available, they 
are a simpler and, I believe, more accurate measure of fair value, in part 
for reasons  identified  by  the authors (e.g.,  the 10 percent  statutory 
minimum general expense). Our preference for home market or third- 
country prices  as the basis for fair value extends to state-controlled 
economy cases as well. Constructed value has been used in only one of 
the seven post-1979 through 1982 state-controlled cases (when there was 
no other non-U.S. seller). During the most recent period for which full 
data are available (1 January 1982 to 30 June 1982), forty-one of  our 
antidumping  determinations  were  based  on  home  market  or third- 
country sales, seven were based on constructed value, and three were a 
combination of  the two. 
To the paper’s brief history of the TPM, I add one insight concerning 
the reasons for the demise of  the second TPM. Certainly the shift of 
exchange rates that made the U.S.  market more lucrative to EC  produc- 
ers and reduced the probability of sales below fair value was important- 
it gave an illusion of safety from unfair trade cases to those EC  producers 
who actively sought such an illusion and provided those producers with 
an undeniable incentive to boost sales to the United States, particularly 
given the dismal state of the EC  market. More important, however, was 
the shift of the likely battleground from dumping to unfair subsidization, 
a shift several EC producers deliberately chose to ignore. 
The  growth of subsidies to steel producers in the European Community 
since 1977, when TPM was first conceived, was breathtaking, and by 1981 
several large EC  producers had become quite vulnerable to countervail- 
ing duty action. Because countervailing duty law is concerned with pric- 
ing only as it bears on injury, whether or not the shift in exchange rates 
had erased sales at less than fair value became increasingly irrelevant; the 
only way for heavily subsidized EC producers to avoid the filing, much 
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quantities to avoid injuring U.S. producers. When August 1981  imports 
of steel from the European Community hit a record 860 thousand tons, it 
was clear that TPM’s usefulness had been overtaken by events. Quantity, 
not price, had become the issue, a change that was recognized in the 
ultimate settlement of the hundred-plus cases filed against EC  producers 
in 1982. (It should be noted that because of  the need to allocate over 
several years many of  the large capital-equipment subsidies received, 
several EC producers will be vulnerable to countervailing duty cases for 
years to come). 
One specific problem with this paper is the analysis of the results of the 
TPM both in the text and in the calibration of the dumping model. While 
a clear theoretical incentive existed under TPM to move steel to the West 
Coast because trigger prices were lower there (allowing more undercut- 
ting of  U.S. prices), the theoretical incentive to sell to the Great Lakes 
where trigger prices were higher provided an opposite motivation. Only 
empirical evidence can reveal what TPMs  effects were, and the analysis 
must consider other factors that might have influenced shifting patterns of 
imports, such as divergent demand trends in the several regions of  the 
United States, the closure of  U.S. plants on the West Coast, and the 
emergence of  steel exporters in South Korea and Taiwan. 
As table C3.1 indicates, the percentage of  total steel imports into the 
West Coast market did not change significantly after TPM’s introduction 
in 1978. In fact, the relative size of  West Coast imports was largest in 
1980,  when the TPM was suspended from March to October, and again in 
the third quarter of  1982, after TPM had been terminated. There was a 
shift of EC  producers to the West Coast in 1978,  but again, the proportion 
of  West Coast sales to total EC imports was greatest during periods of 
TPM suspension. 
A General Accounting Office report is cited as evidence that TPM 
Table C3.1  U.S. Imports of Basic Steel Mill Products on the West Coast as 
Percent of Total U.S. Basic Steel Mill Products Imports, from the 
European Community, Japan, and  Total, 1975-1982 
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caused a shift of  steel imports from independent to foreign-related im- 
porters. Our research, based on data not available to Eichengreen and 
van der Ven, reveals that if  there was such a shift, it was extremely small 
(on the order of 5 percent). U.S.  steel imports have been predominantly 
through importers related to the exporters since long before the TPM was 
implemented. 
I strongly agree that both fraud and legal manipulations posed a threat 
to TPM’s integrity as a monitoring system and offer our experience to 
anyone contemplating price regulation of  imports. Throw up a barrier 
and the marketplace will usually find a way around it, with some cost in 
efficiency. 
The authors’ dumping model strikes me  (a lay person) as a useful 
mathematical model of  a common sense concept. Differential market 
power, supported by protection of  the home market, may account for a 
substantial portion of dumping. In the case of steel, however, it seems to 
me that the actions of the foreign governments should be at the center of 
the model rather than as a mere side assumption to rule out reexportation 
(which transport costs effectively rule out). In the absence of  specific 
modeling of the effects of  EC regulation of  prices, output, and imports, 
Eichengreen  and van  der Ven  are forced  to make  an insupportable 
assumption about the behavior of  EC steel producers. 
Each national European industry is treated as a single firm in construct- 
ing Herfindahl indices,  their  measure of  oligopolistic strength.  They 
argue that this assumption of  national unity is in  “recognition  of  the 
extent of  nationalization and pervasive government involvement in the 
various national industries. ” National  governments  in  the European 
Communities are primarily involved in steel through the provision of 
subsidies; regulation of  competition, output, prices,  and imports are 
overwhelmingly the responsibility of  the European Communities. EC 
regulation has been of  variable intensity over the time period of  this 
study, reaching its peak in the 1980 declaration of a “manifest crisis” and 
the setting of mandatory production quotas for most products. A model 
of oligopolistic competition cannot capture the economic arbitrariness of 
politically based price and output adjustments. 
To treat the German firms of  Thyssen and Klockner as a joint-profit 
maximizer or the supercompetitive Bresciani of Northern Italy as a single 
firm is inappropriate, even if  necessary for simplifying the model. Simi- 
larly, a single Herfindahl index for “steel” ignores the critical variation of 
concentration by product. For example, cold rolled sheet production is 
quite concentrated, while rebar production is distributed among dozens 
of  producers. 
The approximated “dumping margins” for aggregated steel product 
categories which the authors rely on to calibrate their model do not 
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dumpers and as a government official conducting dumping investigations, 
I can testify to the need for exact product comparisons, consideration of 
circumstances of  sale, and all the other details that make dumping investi- 
gations so complicated. Unit value comparisons of  categories of  steel 
products cannot reveal dumping. For example, product differences with- 
in the category of cold rolled sheet can result in wide price variations- 
the last trigger price for the base product of  cold rolled sheet was $416 per 
ton, while the same cold rolled sheets after special treatment could cost 
another $60. In addition, U.S. imports of  rebar from the European 
Communities are too small to make any unit value comparisons reliable. 
An accurate  model of  steel dumping, with  empirical  estimation of 
parameters, would require a much more complex model and data set than 
currently available. Changes in exchange rates, protection of home mar- 
kets, imperfect availability of information, and firm cost structures (par- 
ticularly fixed versus variable cost) all need to be taken into account, and 
the data must be based on precise product comparisons with necessary 
adjustments. I  doubt that anyone  will  make available  the necessary 
resources for such a complete data set for steel; I would be interested in 
seeing Eichengreen and van der Ven’s model applied to a more discrete 
and manageable product. 
The study of  dumping, which is merely price discrimination across 
borders, needs to blend in more completely with a study of domestic price 
discrimination and to focus on how the interposition of  a border, with 
attendant government  interventions of  various sorts, affects firm be- 
havior. The border effects have led to the dramatically different treat- 
ment of  domestic and international price discrimination; a fuller under- 
standing of  what those effects are could help policymakers reevaluate 
whether that differential treatment is justified in light of  the rapid integra- 
tion of national economies since the first dumping law (Canada’s, aimed 
at U.S. Steel!) was written in 1904. This Page Intentionally Left Blank